In Book 1 of Plato’s Republic, Socrates’ refinement of Cephalus’ definition of justice is “speaking the truth and paying your debts”, which Socrates suggests to be wrong (331 d). This however is objected by Polemarchus, claiming that, according to the poet Simonides, his father’s characterization is fitting; at this point, being the superficial man Plato portrays, Cephalus leaves the conversation (331 d). Thus being the heir to Cephalus’ argument (and wealth), Polemarchus is bid by Socrates to elaborate upon his claim, offering a counterexample (331 e). Socrates asks if justice is repayment of one’s debt, then such a definition should hold in all cases; however, Socrates enquires if a person were to ask a friend to keep a weapon, should the friend return the weapon even if the friend asks for it “when he is not in his right senses” (331 e – 332a).
INTERTESTAMENTAL PERIOD: HISTORY OF BEGINNING OF CHRISTIANITY
Contributed by Cassie S. Tritthart
Thursday, 05 August 2010
Political influences of leaders in Biblical times aided the spread of Judaism by opening trade routes with foreign countries, which allowed Judaism to be introduced by lay followers that traveled to and from these previously unexposed regions. Conquests of political leaders paved the way for commerce with newly conquered territories, creating the opportunity for trade. Trade led directly to the implementation of a common language, Greek, leading to the translation of the Bible known as the “Septuagint.” The creation of the Septuagint enabled many people to have access to Biblical scripture for personal reading. Hence, Gentiles and Jews now had access to the Word of God.
My Own Brand of Hero: The Forging of the Equiphant
Contributed by Soren McPherson
Thursday, 13 May 2010
"The very knowledge that we all grow and change throughout life implies that we are growing and changing into 'something'. We know without a doubt that we are changing. What we don't know for certain is whether we are changing into something better, something worse, or just something else. So we say to ourselves "What shall I change into?" and with this question the superhero and the super villain are, of necessity, born."
1. Why be skeptical of contemporary conceptions of the gene?
The contemporary, classical-molecular understanding of “gene” involves a segment of double-stranded DNA which codes for or causes the production of a functional polypeptide chain; this process is essentially characterized by two steps: transcription and translation. During transcription DNA is converted to single-stranded RNA that retains a base sequence that is complementary to that of the original DNA. RNA may be characterized into three main groups: transfer RNA (tRNA), ribosomal RNA (rRNA), and messenger RNA (mRNA). Not only do RNA strands compliment the original DNA, but when taken as a triplet of nucleotides, or codon, they correspond to a specific amino acid, which during translation form polypeptide chains. However, though the correspondence between RNA molecules and amino acids applies to each type of RNA, of the three only the mRNA molecules are translated into polypeptides; tRNA aids in this process and rRNA becomes a part of ribosomes found in the endoplasmic reticulum of a cell. This simplistic sketch provides a quite obvious worry with the above conception; that is, it ignores instances in which RNA molecules are not translated into polypeptides. Thus it is fitting, as textbooks generally do, to modify the above definition in order to include RNA molecules along with polypeptides. However even when this is allowed, other issues still remain.
An Explanation and Critique of Platonic Arguments from Opposites and Recollection found in the Phaed
Contributed by Patrick Lewis
Tuesday, 16 February 2010
In the Phaedo Plato argues for the immortal soul by invoking arguments from opposites, recollection, and scattering. Considering only Plato’s arguments from opposites and recollection, an explanation and critique are given. I suggest that the argument from opposites adequately establishes the necessity in opposing adjectives generating one from another, but reject this notion for nouns. This is a problem for Plato in that he is dealing with the nouns “death” and “life”. I suggest that this may be accounted for by a first-person account of life, which may be established by Plato’s argument from recollection. However, this argument, relying on the existence of the forms, does not establish this. In order to grasp the concept of absolute such and such, a person merely needs their imagination, opinion, or definition.